

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM  
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WH/PW Chemo

SUGGESTED DISPATCH

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[ 2158 ]

TO : [ ] Info: [ ]  
FROM : Chief, GID  
SUBJECT: KUCAGE Operational  
Activities of Guatemalan Exiles

1. Reports concerning the activities of Guatemalan exiles suggest that they are achieving considerable success in mounting counter-attacks inimical to the administration of Carlos CASTILLO Armas and to the interests of the United States. The following references illustrate the nature of their efforts to date with regard to propaganda and front organizations:

A) "Guatemala, la Democracia, y el Imperio;" a vitriolic book by ex-President Juan Jose AREVALO attacking the United States and the United Fruit Company and charging both with complicity in the anti-ARBENZ revolution of 1954. Printed and published in Santiago, Chile, 11 July 1954.

B) "Declaracion de la Emigracion Democratica de Guatemala", a communist line document issued to coincide with a press conference in Mexico by Jacobo ARBENZ Guzman (a conference which was cancelled at the suggestion of Mexican officials). Dated 20 October 1954, the 10th anniversary of the revolution of 1944. Apparently a one-shot publication, but distributed in other area countries as evidenced by one copy intercepted in Panama (enclosure to [ ] 3126).

C) "Informativo Sindical de Guatemala", attributed to the Confederacion General de Trabajadores de Guatemala (CGTG) and apparently published in Mexico as evidenced by a copy intercepted at San Jose,

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Costa Rica (enclosure to [ ] 1033). Probably identical with the "Boletin Informativo Sindical" which is being circulated in Guatemala according to Weeka No. 9 dated 3 March 1955. Weeka No. 9 also stated that Victor Manuel GUTIERREZ, former Secretary General of the CGTG and prominent Communist is reportedly working in CTAL Headquarters, Mexico, where he presumably handles publication of "Informativo Sindical."

D) "Saludo a los trabajadores de Guatemala", another Communist-line propaganda document published on the third anniversary of the foundation of the CGTG. (See [ ]).

E) "Carta de Guatemala", mailed in Mexico to a prominent Communist labor leader in Panama (enclosure to [ ] 3575). No attribution indicated but obviously a product of Communist or pro-Communist Guatemalan exiles in Mexico. The title and content, the format, and the quality of the paper and printing suggest that this document may be issued on a regular rather than a one-shot basis, but there was no indication of the contemplated periodicity.

2. Other activities by Guatemalan exiles include: (A) the reported organization of a political party in Mexico using the name of the existing Partido de Accion Revolucionaria (PAR) and the political program of Partido de la Revolucion Guatemalteca (PRG). [ ] dated \_\_\_\_\_ 1955 stated that leading Communists have not joined the remodeled PAR, but known members are clearly representative of the pro-Communists and sympathizers who ably served the Communist cause during the ARBENZ regime; (B) establishment by the Mexican Communist Party of a "defense committee" for the protection of Guatemalan exiles. The committee reportedly has its

-3-

Headquarters at Calle Hamburgo 9, Mexico City. Significantly, this Communist unit is said to be headed by Waldeman BARRIOS Klee, former Deputy Chief of the Guatemalan Departamento Agrario Nacional under ARBENZ and a leading Communist agitator; (C) circulation in Guatemala of a clandestine Communist newspaper Frente; (D) broadcasts by a clandestine radio station calling itself "Radio Recuperacion". Either or both of the last two activities may be the work of Communists within Guatemala itself, but it is safe to presume that exiles are at least indirectly involved and will render support at every opportunity.

3. In view of the foregoing information it is deemed advisable to consider tentative plans designed to contain the exiles in Mexico and insure that their activities, whether motivated by selfish interests or devotion to the Communist cause, will be rendered ineffective. The following suggestions, reflecting Headquarters thinking regarding this matter, are submitted for field consideration and guidance:

A) Some aspects of the asylee situation such as the extradition proceedings have been exploited to the point where further KUCAGE action might well be counter-productive. The right of asylum is a sacred tradition in Latin America and any KUCAGE action following legal court decisions to deny extradition could create a situation wherein the target individuals would be cast in the role of martyrs. Rather than contribute to that undesirable result, it is recommended that extradition per se should not be emphasized in future operations aimed at Guatemalan

exiles.

B) Until further notice it is recommended that, for KUCAGE purposes, the activities of Guatemalan asylees be carefully observed to detect any undesirable actions or associations which could be utilized to discredit, immobilize or expel them from the host country. [ ]

[ ] should be especially alert for evidence of criminal conduct or interference in local political affairs in violation of the rules of asylum. Propagation of such evidence for the purposes mentioned above should employ the following theme among others that will undoubtedly occur to [ ] concerned: Guatemalan exiles are morally undesirable residents and their actions tend to prove previous charges that they were guilty, as charged, of common crimes and atrocities and were then, as now, members of the subversive Communist conspiracy in Latin America. Any operations carried out along the lines indicated in this paragraph must be judiciously planned and executed lest they also result in martyrdom for the targets. The evidence to be exploited must be carefully studied in order to estimate whether public opinion will be influenced in the desired manner. When doubt exists as to the probable outcome, it is suggested that no action be taken.

C) As an alternative to the preceding suggestion, [ ] having political action [ ] might securely place convincing evidence in the hands of government officials who could be expected to take appropriate action. Direct but unpublicized action of this sort might be preferable when it is possible that conventional KUCAGE methods might, as suggested above, make an undesirable impact or, as a further example, result in gratuitous publicity for an otherwise obscure and

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-5-

relatively unimportant target personality.

D) When possible, it might be useful to discredit the individuals and organizations which actively render support and sympathy to the exiles. However, attacks against such targets should be based on vulnerabilities other than mere support of or sympathy for the exiles. In most cases it might be best to completely ignore the exile issue lest the traditional attitudes toward the question of asylum reduce the effectiveness of the attack (i.e., whereas a straight anti-Communist line might capitalize on non-Communist sentiments, the injection of the asylee issue might cause indecision). The purpose of the operations suggested in this paragraph would be to weaken pro-asylee sentiment as expressed by the suggested targets and thereafter make the asylees themselves more vulnerable to direct attack.

4. The activities of Guatemalan exiles in other area countries apparently do not compare in scope or seriousness with those attributed to exiles residing in Mexico, therefore the provisions of this communication are primarily directed to [ ] and [ ]

] However, all information addressees should find it useful if and when it is necessary to plan or conduct operations aimed at the Guatemalan asylees in their areas.

5. Both [ ] and [ ] should feel free to initiate lateral communications on this subject in order to insure maximum mutual support in the conduct of operations.

AH/PW