

LIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
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2003

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SUBJECT: Conference Between CALLIGERIS, SEEKFORD, and HINDMARSH/
TO : ARAB
FOR : BARBA ROJA

I explained to CALLIGERIS that his plan had been received and subjected to a preliminary study, resulting in the eleven questions that he had received. I stated that further study and questioning would be necessary and that I was here to act as liaison between the group and himself. We then proceeded to discuss his plan. This report is submitted in question and answer form, the question by me the answers by CALLIGERIS/

1. Before going into a detailed discussion would you give me a general review of your proposed operation?

On D Day my forces in Mexico, El Salvador, and Honduras will cross the frontier with the mission of drawing the government forces out from the Capital and pinning them down. At the same time a small, well armed force will enter the harbor of Puerto Barrios and capture that city and Livingston. Immediately following this I will send a force in small boats across the Lake Izabel and up the Polochic River to that point where the river joins the road leading to Cobán. These boats will carry the arms and supplies which will be used to equip the force assembled in Cobán. They will be met by trucks which will carry the supplies to Cobán. I will enlarge the beach-head at Puerto Barrios and move up the railline towards Progress as soon as possible. I will take over immediately the radio station in Puerto Barrios and use it to communicate with my troops throughout the country and, to talk to the people of Guatemala. My aircraft will carry out bombings of the key installations in the Capital and throughout the country. I have asked for flame-throwers for the psychological effect they will have on the government troops and the people. My basic idea is to be so equipped and to hit with such shock action that the government, its troops, and the people will feel that we have everything and that our force is overwhelming. I hope by this means to reduce their "will to resist" rapidly.

2. As I understand it then you will not move a large force up the Polochic but only that equipment necessary to outfit the force that will come into existence in Cobán on D Day.

That is Correct.

3. Why have you selected Cobán as the area in which you will assemble your major force and from which you will move on the Capital? It would appear that ~~near~~ the frontiers or even the Valley of the River Motagua would provide better routes of approach.

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My reasons for selecting Cobán are several;

- a. I have been assured of complete support by the people of this area in men, trucks, and supplies. I expect to raise over 2000 men here.
- b. Trucks, petrol, and other supplies are more readily available.
- c. The government anticipates and is prepared to cope with any force crossing the frontiers or up the River Motagua. To our best information the government does not expect a threat from the Cobán area nor are they as well prepared to resist it.

4. What trucks are available in the Cobán area and what will be your needs?

There are over 200 trucks in the area, most 2 1/2 tons, though some are larger. I will require about 60. Local petrol supplies are sufficient to meet my needs.

5. Will not the terrain and limited road net favor the defense, i.e. the government in your advance on the Capital from Coban?

From Cobán to Salamá we will be going uphill over the mountains. From Salamá to the Capital we will be going down hill and the terrain will be in our favor and against the defense. The road from Cobán to the Capital is serviceable and passable all the year round. As I have indicated, I will make the movement in 8 days.

6. In your estimate of the situation you anticipate the government sending its forces out from the Capital to resist your forces crossing the frontiers. What do you propose to do if the government decides to fall back, await your arrival, and defend the Capital?

I will encircle and isolate the Capital from the rest of the country. By aerial bombardment and direct assault I will force it to capitulate. In planning I have considered this possibility and believe I will have no difficulty in doing this. Incidentally, if this situation develops I expect the present government to ask for and receive help from El Salvador. This help will be in the form of air resupply. If I receive the aircraft I have asked for I will be able to prevent this. Actually, though I have sought to provide for every contingency, I believe that the acts of sabotage and armed revolt that will accompany my invasion will cause the government to fall quickly and that a fight for the Capital will be unnecessary.

7. Have you considered the problem of communications?

Yes. Prior to D Day each commander will be thoroughly briefed and will be prepared to act independently. After I have established Puerto Barrios as my Supply Base and Headquarters I will use the radio station there for communicating with my commanders. As soon as possible after D Day I will

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distribute, by means of my aircraft, radio sets to each of my commanders. In any event the commanders will know their missions and act independently until such time as I can contact them.

8. Do you have any force now in existence? If so, what is its degree of organization and level of training?

At the present time I have no force in existence. The inherent problem of security and the cost of maintaining such a force prevents this at this time. I have a core of some 25 army officers and a few NCOs, all former members of the Guatemalan army, around which I intend to build my forces. These men have already been selected and placed in Guatemala and in the neighboring countries. Each has received general instructions as to his mission and each knows the men he will call together on my signal. After we cross the frontier I expect others to join but I have kept my initial striking force small for rapid movement.

9. Will you outline your plans for assembling and equipping these men just prior to D Day.

I am in constant touch with the leaders of the various groups in Guatemala and in the frontier areas. When D Day has been decided upon I will have selected individuals report to me for final briefing and instructions. This will require about three weeks. Just prior to D Day the men will gather in the assembly areas and receive their equipment. On D Day each commander will proceed to carryout his instructions. The more difficult, but by no means impossible, part of this phase will be the distribution of arms and equipment to the assembly areas. In Mexico we can buy the necessary arms and it will therefore not be necessary to smuggle them into the country. In El Salvador and Honduras smuggling will be necessary. If you will deliver the arms and equipment to me in northern Honduras I will assume the responsibility of delivering to the proper areas in Honduras and El Salvador. This will require about 8 days. I have the men and the means of doing this. As for the water borne force for the invasion of Puerto Barrios, I had considered that it could be based on some small uninhabited island off shore or perhaps on the mainland.

COMMENT: It was obvious from the questioning that followed that CALLIGERIS had not thoroughly worked out this phase of the operation. He had no specific island in mind nor any particular spot on the mainland. I sensed that he expected help from us on this matter. He mentioned LCI's, and though he did not definitely so state, I felt that he had in mind an operation where his force would embark from a larger vessel into LCI's for the movement on Puerto Barrios. You will note further discussion of this point under question 13.

COMMENT: Considering the general question of landing and moving equipment through Honduras HINDMARSH believes that President Galvez of Honduras can and should be approached on this matter. Galvez has some knowledge of CALLIGERIS' activities and is aware of HINDMARSH's desire to help him. HINDMARSH has offered to Galvez again to lay the matter before him and ask his help. He believes however that it would be better if a man from

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our Headquarters came down and spoke to Galvez. He believes that if a man of sufficient prestige would come down and speak frankly to Galvez he would be successful in securing the President's help. HIND-MARSH is willing to pave the way for such a visit by calling on the President a day or two prior to our man's visit.

10. Do you have pilots to fly the planes you ask for?

No. [] has offered to help. Perhaps your people could contact him on this matter.

11. What size naval craft did you have in mind?

For the larger vessels I had in mind vessels of 1000 tons. For the smaller ones vessels of about 400 tons with not over 5 ft. draft.

12. Do you have crews to man the larger vessels?

No.

COMMENT: Here again CALLIGERIS is apparently looking to us for help.

13. If the supplies and equipment you require were landed on the north coast of Honduras (west of Cortes) and your striking force for Puerto B Barrios embarked from there would not several small schooners of the type at present in use on the coast meet your needs.

Yes, I believe so.

14. Do you have someone who knows the north coast well and is familiar with the shipping in the area? If so, could he prepare you a report?

Yes, I have such a man, and he could prepare such a report.

COMMENT: CALLIGERIS was instructed to take no action on this until asked to do by us.

15. Have you considered the amount of cash you will need in executing your plan?

Yes I have. I will need funds to purchase arms and some supplies in Mexico. I wish to pay each of my men a small sum just prior to D Day. After we assume control of Guatemala we will need funds to carry on during the period of re-adjustment. We could use some funds right now.

COMMENT: An estimate of the cash needed is attached to this report.

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COMMENT: Subsequent to the meeting I discussed with HINDMARSH the desirability of making an immediate advance to CALLIGERIS. He believes it should be done. If Headquarters approves HINDMARSH said he will advance me \$5000.00 (US) which I can pass on to CALLIGERIS. HINDMARSH stated that whether or not he was re-imbursed by our Headquarters was unimportant. At the conclusion of my meeting with CALLIGERIS HINDMARSH handed him some money which CALLIGERIS said he needed to take care of two of his NCOs. Some weeks ago HINDMARSH handed CALLIGERIS [] CALLIGERIS handed it back with the request that HINDMARSH give it to [] as he needed it more. HINDMARSH has complete confidence in CALLIGERIS' integrity. HINDMARSH also feels that funds should be advanced to [] to keep him going. HINDMARSH reported to me that [] recently told him that he has [] in his control but which he cannot use until the invasion starts. [] reports that the money continues to come in.

16. [] states in his report that he believes the invasion must take place not later than the last two weeks in July. What is your opinion?

I agree that it should take place not later than 1 August if we are to take maximum advantage of our own forces and organization and the current political situation. An extended delay will unquestionably see a gradual deterioration of our organization and an increased pressure on us by the present government. We must act as soon as possible.

17. In recent weeks there have been increased attempts at sabotage and attacks on the police. Will these increase or can you control them and ask your people to wait?

I can, and have, sent word in asking everyone to "sit tight" until I give the signal. I have told them that we are preparing and that help is coming but frankly their patience is wearing thin. It would help considerably if I could send in word giving some tentative date towards which we could all work. I cannot hold them indefinitely particularly if the government increases its activities against us.

----- End of Conference with CALLIGERIS -----

Attached to this report you will find a report on the airfields in Guatemala. A report on troop and depot dispositions will be given to me at my next meeting.

I was impressed with the manner in which CALLIGERIS answered all my questions. Obviously time did not permit complete coverage of all phases of the plan. The briefing will continue during later meetings.

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I do not intend to see CALLIGERIS again until I have received a reply from Headquarters and BARBA ROJA on this report with any new instructions.

I appreciate that Headquarters is not in a position to support a military operation in July and yet there is the problem of maintaining CALLIGERIS and his organization until such time as we may desire to use him. Therefore I would appreciate a detailed report explaining why a military operation is not desirable at this time and at the same time include some general proposals for action. This would assure him of our good faith and give him something to hold his own followers in check.

I would appreciate a telegraphic reply to HINDMARSH's suggestion to advance CALLIGERIS \$5000.00

JACOB R/ SEEKFORD

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